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PORTUGUESETIMOR:AN INDONESIANDILEMMA
DONALD E. WEATHERBEE
Out of theclamorand heat of Sukarno'sIndonesia'sconfrontationwiththe"Old EstablishedForces" emergedan imageof a revolutionrevisionistand implacably
ary Indonesian foreignpolicy determinedly
opposedto the maintenanceor extensionof Westernpowerand influence
sphere.Sukarno'sIndonesianRevolutionwas "actively
in the Afro-Asian
and colonialism
opposedto, and hittinghard at, all formsof imperialism
wherevertheyoccur."' Indonesiadid not refrainfromacts calculatedto
upsetthestatusquo in SoutheastAsia, and indeedjustifiedthemin terms
ideology.Yet, at the same timethat Indonesiawas
of its anti-imperialist
claimingits place in the vanguardof the "New EmergingForces," it
on its own dooracceptedthe tangiblepresenceof traditionalimperialism
political unit in
step. Indonesia,the most aggressivelyanti-imperialist
South Asia, is contiguouswith,surrounds,and peacefullycoexistswith
vestigesof PortugueseAsian empire-Portuone of the twoanachronistic
being,ofcourse,Macao).
gueseTimor(theotherfragment
of Portuguesedominancein
theimpermanence
D. G. E. Hall, surveying
Asia, wrote"Yet whenall has been said regardingthe moribundstate of
thefactremains
century,
thePortugueseempireat theend of thesixteenth
timein dying."2 That it
that,like CharlesII, it tookan unconscionable
area occupiedby Indonesiais a
is in factnot dead withinthe territorial
of Indonesianforeignpolicy.
bias
ideological
the
given
anomoly
piquant
of PortugueseTimoras a problemforIndonesianforeign
An examination
policywithinthe contextof the proclaimedpolicy goals providessome
approachto the
of Indonesia'srevolutionary
insightsintothedeterminants
as wellas
betweenideologyand interest,
therelationship
world,particularly
illuminatesthe possible futureof Portugueseimperialismin the archipelago.
PortugueseTimor
of thestringof islandsarchingeastwardsfrom
Timoris theeasternmost
as theLesser Sundas
Java to the Banda Sea whichare knowncollectively
(Indonesian:Nusa Tenggara). The entireisland is about 300 mileslong
withan averagewidthof 60 miles.PortugueseTimorconsistsof the eastern half of the island (approximately5,700 square miles), the coastal
in westernTimor, and the two islands of
enclave of Occussi-Ambenu
Atauroand Jaco,fora totalarea of 7,383squaremiles(New Jersey-7,836
square miles). The capital and only urban centeris Dili (Dilli, Dilly)
1 Sukarno,PoliticalManifesto,IndependenceDay Address,Aug. 17, 1959.
2D. G. E. Hall, A Short History of South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955),
p. 206.
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located on the northcoast. The entireprovinceis oftenreferredto as
Timor-Dili.
The populationof PortugueseTimorwas recordedin the 1960 censusas
517,079,distributedunevenly,withan averagedensityof 23 per square
kilometer.
Dili has a populationof about 7,000.Althoughthe 1960 census
did not indicatethe racial compositionof the population,such data was
includedin the 1950 census,and thereis no reasonto believethatthegeneral proportionshave greatlychanged.The 1950 figuresare given in
Table I. It shouldbe notedthatTimorhas thelowestpercentageof European inhabitantsof all of theOverseasProvincesof Portugal.
TABLE I
Compositionof PortugueseTimor'sPopulation in 19503
European
568
Mestico (mixed blood)
2,022
Chinese
3,122
Other non-indigenous(Goan, etc.)
212
indigenous-civilizado
1,541
indigenous-ndo-civilizado
434,907
Total
442,378

The distinctionbetweencivilizado and ndo-civilizadoin Portuguese
The termcivilizadodenotesthose
"colonial"practicehas been important.
individualswho may be countedas being culturallymodernas opposed
to traditional.
Theoretically,
thegoal of Portuguesepolicyis to assimilate
theindigenous
peopleto thePortuguesewayof life.This is euphemistically
calledachievingdesiredlevelsof economicand socialprogress.Of the 1950
populationonly 7,471 (1 .8<,) of the total-i.e., all but the ndo-civilizado
categoryin Table I-were classifiedas civilizado.Thus, less than4/10ths
of one percentof the indigenouspopulationhave been assimilatedafter
morethanthreecenturies
of ruleby Portugal.Of thetotalpopulationmore
than98%-are consideredto be outsideof thelimitsof westerncivilization.
It was not untilthe firstyearsof the 18thcenturythatthe Portuguese
on Timor.4Portugueseinterestin
establisheda permanentadministration
the island,however,dates back to the sixteenthcentury.Timor'ssandalwood was an importanttrade itemand the Portuguesesent annual collectionmissionsto the island. The Dominicanfriarsalso had established
themselvesin the easternLesser Sundas by the middleof the sixteenth
3 These figuresare givenin United Nations Document A/AC.109/L.67,July 10, 1963,
para. 51.
4 The materialon PortugueseTimor is drawn principallyfromthe followingsources:
Timor-BackgroundPaper Prepared by the Secretariat,United Nations doc. A/AC.108/
L.13, Dec. 3, 1962; William Burton Sowash, "Colonial Rivalries in Timor," The Far
Eastern Quarterly,VII:3 (May, 1948), pp. 227-235; C. R. Boxer, "PortugueseTimorA Rough Island Story: 1515-1960," History Today, X:5 (May, 1960), pp. 349-355.
Since the preparation of this manuscriptwas completed, an American Universities
Field Staffreporthas describedthe Portugueseeffortsto modernizeTimor. See Willard
A. Hanna, "Reanimated Timor," AUFS, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XIV, Nos. 7, 8
and 9.
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In 1962theDutchEast India Companyenteredthearea and began
century.
to displacethePortuguese.Competition
betweentheDutch and the Portuguesein Timorwas regulatedby a treatyof 1661 thatgave theDutch the
westernpartof theislandand thePortuguesethe eastern.Constantinternecinewarfaremarkedthe historyof the island. The Dutch mounteda
numberof pacificationcampaigns,and by the middleof the eighteenth
century,had firmlysecured themselvesin the west. The Portuguese,
althoughpressednotonlyby theindigenous
warsbutby theDutch as well,
did notstrongly
garrisontheisland.Theirpositionwas tenuous,restingon
theabilityto playoneindigenous
groupoffagainstanother.
During the NapoleonicWars the BritishoccupiedDutch Timor. The
Dutch reoccupation
afterthe war openeda new periodin the historyof
the joint occupanyof the island.Althoughboth countriesrecognizedone
another'srights,therewas a constantirritantover undefined
boundaries.
The Dutch wouldhave liked to purchasePortugueseTimorbut Portugal
was onlywillingto negotiateboundaries.The long historyof boundary
discussionscenteredon the questionof the enclavesheld by both powers
withinthe other'sterritory.
A mixed commissionworkingin 1898-99
settledmostof the outstandingissues,and a conventionembodyingthe
borderagreement
was signedat the Hague in 1904. However,a further
difficulty
arose concerning
the easternboundaryof the Occussi-Ambenu
enclave.This questionwas referred
to thePermanentCourtof Arbitration,
and in 1914 a decisionwas handeddown.From thatpointon, the boundariesofTimorhavenotbeencalledintoquestion.
The jointinterestof the twopowersin Timor,to the exclusionof third
parties,receivedtreatystatusin a convention
signedin Lisbon in 1893 in
whichinteralia Portugaland theNetherlands
promisedpreference
to each
otherin the eventof the disposalof theirrightsin Timor. In the 1904
Hague convention
thesignatories
agreednot to cede theirrightsin Timor
to anythirdparty.
PortugueseTimorwas firstadministered
fromGoa and latercame under
thejurisdiction
of Macao. In 1896,Timorwas separatedfromMacao and
became a separateadministrative
unit. It was not until afterthe final
militarypacificationcampaignin 1913 that civil government
was introof commercialagriculture,
duced.Withpacification
came the introduction
particularly
coffee,
makinguse of forcedlabor. The Europeanpopulation
ofPortugueseTimorhas alwaysbeensmall.For a timetheterritory
served
as a penalcolony.After1930 an effort
was made to attractPortuguesesettlersto the island forplantationdevelopment,
but withoutmuchsuccess.
AlthoughPortugalwas a neutralin WorldWar II, Timordid notescape
the ravagesof the war in the Pacific.It was occupiedin turnby allied,
Japaneseand again allied forces,and themodesteconomicprogressin the
colonywas setback. The Portuguesewereable to reasserttheirsovereignty
afterthewarwithoutdifficulty.
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By Portugueselaw Timoris an integralpartof thePortugueseRepublic
withtheadministrative
statusof an OverseasProvince.Until 1951 Timor,
as well as the otherdependenciesof Portugal,was a colony.In thatyear
theconstitutional
ofthePortuguese
framework
empirewas changedto incorporatetheextra-European
intothestate.Nevertheless,
territories
according
to UnitedNations sources,"The relationshipof . . . Timor to Portugal
remainsessentiallya colonialone and the inhabitantsof theseterritories
have verylimitedparticipation
in the centraland local organsof govern)
ment."
As a partial responseto the increasingvolumeof foreigncriticismof
Portugal's"colonial" policy,the Lisbon authoritieshave in recentyears
made an effortto create administrative
structuresin the overseasprovincesmorebroadlybased thanin thepastand to bringtheindigenous
inhabitantsof overseasPortugalintoclosercontactwithlocal government.
This
was the main thrustof the new OverseasOrganicLaw of 1963 and was
givenspecificapplicationin thenewStatuteof Timor.6In discussingpolitical evolutionin theOverseasProvinces,it is necessary,
however,to remember that the nature of the centralgovernment
itselfis the important
determinant
of the directionof changein the non-metropolitan
parts of
Portugal.Portugalis a corporativerepublic.The state is organizedalong
highlycentralizedlines with interestrepresentation
being a functionof
thevariouscorporative
bodies.
The chiefgovernmental
officer
of PortugueseTimor is the Governor,
appointedfromLisbonby theCouncilof Ministers.7
In 1963, forthe first
time,a LegislativeCouncilwas established.The old appointiveGovernmentCouncilwas retainedas an executiveadvisorybody.The new Legislative Council has powersgreaterthan the formerGovernment
Council
had and sharessomeof theauthority
of the Governor.Membershipon the
Councilis obtainedby electionfollowingthe Portuguesecorporativepattern.
Representation
is indirect,
therefore.
AfterWorldWar II all inhabitants
of Timorweregrantedcitizenship.This did not carrywithit the rightto
a ballot.Suffrage
was effectively
restricted
to thecivilizados.As partof its
attemptto giveat least thesemblanceof greaterparticipation
in thepolitical processto all inhabitantsof the OverseasProvinces,the Portuguese
in 1963 promulgateda new electorallaw that theoretically
government
broughtthe ndo-civilizadosinto the electoralmachinery.However,the
qualifications
set by thenewlaw,particularly
withrespectto property
and
5 UnitedNations doc. A/5160,Aug. 15, 1962,para. 46.

6 Estatuto Politico-Administrativo da provincia de Timor (Agencia-Geral do
Ultramar,Lisboa, 1963). See also United Nations doc. A/AC.109/L.126,June 9, 1964.
7 The governmental
structureof PortugueseTimor parallels that of the othersmaller
Overseas Provinces: Cape Verde Islands, Macao, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe.
Angola and Mozambique have a somewhatdifferent
institutionalframework.
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tax requirements,
are such thatthe indigenouspeople are still effectively
debarred.One UnitedNationsappraisalstates:
Eventhough
theNativeStatute
hasbeenrepealed,
theright
to voteand
in theLegislative
to participate
Councilsand in theadministration
of
theterritories
stillappearsto be relatedto theattainment
of a degree
of'socialprogress'
whichin effect
meanstheassimilation
of Portuguese
culture
and theattainment
of a Portuguese
wayof life.8
Despite thenewgovernmental
look on Timoras a resultof the dictated
adjustments
of theOverseasOrganicLaw of 1963 and thesubsequentnew
StatuteforTimor,in termsof controlfromLisbon and lack of effective
indigenousrepresentation,
littlehas been changed.The United Nations
Special Committeeconcernedwith Portugueseoverseas territorieshas
appraisedthe 1963 reforms
in thesewords,"[It] does not make any substantialchangesin the powersof the organsof Portugal'sgovernment
to
legislateforterritories
Unfortuwhichhave been describedpreviously.",'
natelytheredoes not seem to be any way to ascertainTimoresereaction
to Portugal'srule,at leastwithinTimor.In thevariousreportsand papers
fromUnitedNationssourcesthattreatTimor,one usuallymeetstherather
in the
resignedstatement,
"No information
concerning
politicalmovements
is available."10
territory
The principaleconomicactivityof the PortugueseTimoreseis subsistanceagriculture,
of maizewithsomewetrice
chiefly
shifting
cultivation
culture.Timoris resourcepoor,and hopes fordevelopment
have been illfounded.The GeneralAssemblyof theUnitedNationshas been told that,
"In thepost-warperiodtherehas been no significant
progressin the economicdevelopment
of Timor."AdThis statementwas made in the middle
of Timor'ssecond five-year
developmentplan (1959-64). The developmentplans,modestly
financed(secondplan-six milliondollars)have concentratedon the reconstruction
of theportof Dili, resourcedevelopment,
and transportation.
Public servicesin Timor are poorlydeveloped,with
the generation
of electricity,
transportation
facilities,and communications
beingabsentorinadequateoutsideofDili.
Despite a tariff-free
market,onlya smallpart of Timors'tradeis with
Portugal.The principalexportsare coffee,
whichprovidesabout two-thirds
of thevalue of all exports,copra,and rubber.The largestmarketsare in
NorthernEurope.Althoughthevolumeof exportshas been steadilyrising,
theprovinceshowsa persistent
and sizeabledeficitin its tradebalance.
8

UnitedNations doc. A/AC.109/L.126,June9, 1964,para. 73
9Ibid., para. 21.
10 For example, United Nations doc. A/AC.109/67,July 10, 1963, para. 58; doc.
A/AC.108/L.13,Dec. 3, 1962,para. 35.
11UnitedNations doc. A/5160,Aug. 15, 1962,para. 242.
12Table 9 in United Nations doc. A/AC.108/L.13, Dec. 3, 1962, gives the trade
figuresforthe decade 1950-1960.
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The ameliorationof this deficitwould requirenot only increasedinvestmentin the exportsectorof the economybut the developmentof local
enterprises
forimportsubstitution.
A word shouldbe said at thispoint about anotheraspect of Timor's
trade,and that is the illegal movementof goods across the borderwith
Indonesia.Smuggling
has beena recurrent
themein the Indonesian-Portugueserelationship.
Of course,part of what the authorities
mightconsider
illicittradeis a naturaland freeexchangeby theindigenous
peopleofTimor
to whomartificial
international
boundarieshave littlesignificance.
Furthermore,it cannotbe deniedthatsomebusinessmen
on theIndonesianside of
the borderhave showna preference
for exchangegainingthemescudos
ratherthanrupiah.13
The factthateconomicand socialprogressin Timorhas beenso retarded
can be attributed
to a numberof causes.Not theleast is its physicalisolation.Infrequent
flights
fromDarwinand perhapsa dozenshipsa yearmake
it a fairlyremoteoutpostof empire.A secondfactorhas been the absence
of a large European settlercommunity.
revenueis
Thirdly,government
limited,affording
an ordinarybudgetof less than threemilliondollarsa
year.A finalelementhas been the delayedrecognition
by the Portuguese
that only with programsaimed at openingup the modern
government
worldto thetraditional
populationof Timorwilla climatefordevelopment
be created.As thepresentGovernorof the Provincehas stated,"It is no
use in havingtechnicaladvancesand big materialimprovements
that the
peoplecannotunderstand
and takeadvantageof.">14
The keyto a betterlifefortheinhabitants
of PortugueseTimor,if they
remainPortuguese,is education,and thereby,assimilation.In 1950 the
adultilliteracy
rateon Timorwas placedbetween95-99%. Whateducation
therewas in thenon-urban
areaswas in thehandsof theCatholicmissions.
Government
schoolswereprimarily
forthe civilizados.As late as 1960, it
was estimatedthat primaryschool enrollment
in the Provincewas only
about 6%' of the totalschoolage population.In February,1964, changes
wereintroducedin theeducationsystemto make primaryschoolingcompulsoryforchildrenbetweentheages of 6 and 12. But, stillless thanhalf
of theprimaryschoolage populationis in factin school.Part of theproblemis thelack of teachersand schools.Thereis also a questionof the relevancyof curriculaand textbooks
fortheuse of Portupreparedprimarily
guese childrenin Portugal.It remainsto be seen whetherPortugalwill
have theopportunity
to provethatits newresolution
in Timorwillproduce
a newsociety.15
1-3See "Remnantsof Empire,II. PortugueseTimor," Far Eastern Economic Review,
XXX:11 (Dec. 15, 1960), p. 585.
14 Col. Jose AlbertyCorreia,as reportedby Tillman Durdin in the New York Times,
Dec. 13, 1965.
15 Durdin,ibid.
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PortugueseTimorin IndonesianForeignPolicy
The continuedpresenceof a colonialregimeon Timor,notwithstanding
Portugueseconstitutional
fictions,coexistingwith Sukarno'sIndonesian
and NEFO resolutionsat firstglance could appear to mark Indonesian
inconsistency
of purpose.When viewedagainstthe backgroundof active
policies against Dutch imperialismin West New Guinea and what, by
Indonesiandefinition,
was continuedBritishimperalismin Malaysia, the
restraintthat Indonesiahas exercisedtowardPortugueseimperialismin
Timorseemsto be uncharacteristic.
Althoughall of the ingredients
of a
courseof actiondirectedtowardsthe expulsionof the Portugueseseemto
be present,therehas notbeen formulated
an official
Indonesianpolicyspecificallydirectedto the eliminationof Portugueserule on Timor.
This does not implyan absence of Indonesianinterestor lack of consciousnessthata problemforIndonesianforeignpolicymightexist.Even
beforeIndia had extinguished
Goa's colonialexistence,a move thathighlightedtheegregiouspresenceof thePortuguesein Timor,theVice Chairmanof Sukarno'sSupremeAdvisoryCouncilcalled on thepeopleof Indonesia to "fillyourheartswithhatrednot onlyforPortuguesecolonialism,
butforall colonialism
stillexisting
on Asianand Africansoil,"threateningly
addingthat Indonesia's"eyes and heartare directedtowardPortuguese
Timor and Goa," which,"are still under the power of colonialism."16
Indonesianshave notbeen indifferent
to the supposedplightof theinhabitantsof PortugueseTimorwho,by definition,
are "suffering"
underalien
domination.GeneralNasution has characterizedthe situationin Portu17 FormerForeignMinisterSubangueseTimoras one of "enslavement."
drio attemptedto use Timoras a hostagein the struggleagainstPortugueserulein Africa.DiscussingAngolain the IndonesianPeople's RepresentativeCongress,he warnedthe Lisbon authoritiesnot to ignorethe
attitudesand temperof the Indonesianpeople because,"Indonesialies so
close to one of Portugal'scolonies-PortgueseTimor,"addingthe implied
threat,"Do notwaituntiltheIndonesianpeople'sangerflaresup." 18 But
the Indonesiangovernment
has not stoked this particularrevolutionary
fire,and theverbalcondemnations
ofLisbon'spolicyand hortatory
injunctionsagainstPortuguesecolonialismhave not given way to substantive
acts to eradicatevestigialPortugueseimperiumin SouthernAsia. On the
whole,IndonesianrelationswithPortugal,at least in so far as Timoris
concerned,
have been correct,if not good. Since the Springof 1965,however,the relationsbetweenthe two countrieshave been a state of sus16 Ruslan Abdulgani,speech at protestrally on Angola, sponsoredby the Afro-Asian
People's SolidarityOrganization,Jakarta,July 12, 1961.
17 As reportedby Antara,Dec. 22, 1962.
18 Subandrio,statementto plenarysession of the Dewan Perwakilan
Rakjat, July 3,
1961.
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A Portuguesespokesmanhas describedrelationsbetween
pendedanimation.
theadjoiningterritories
on Timoras "cordial."19
Incidentsand disputeshave occurredalong the bordersof Timorwhich
could have been construedby Jakartaas provocationand a pretextfor
a moreaggressive
policyif it had so desired.In mid-1962,forinstance,the
Portuguesegovernment
announcedthat two Indonesiansand one Portuguesehad beenkilledin whatweredescribedas purelydomesticborderincidents.The officialIndonesiannews agency,Antara,on the otherhand,
chargedthe Portugueseauthoritieswith "provokingtroubleby creating
tensionsamongthe local people," kidnappingIndonesiancitizens,incursions into Indonesianterritory
to steal cattleand goods,and smuggling.
More seriousaccusationsby Indonesia of Portuguesebatteriesfiringon
coastwiseshippingwerevigorouslydeniedby Portugaland werenot pursued by Indonesia.It is doubtfulthatmuchmoreshouldbe read into the
sporadicoutburstsalong the bordersand the accompanying
tensionsthan
the frictions
in thenatureof such a joint occupancy,complicated
inherent
by thelack ofethnicdefinition
alongthefrontier.
Indonesian governmentofficialsin repeated public statementshave
recognizedthat Indonesiansovereignty
does not encompassPortuguese
Timor.Anyclaimto theterritory
has beencategorically
abjured."We have
no claimson PortugueseTimor,noron NorthBorneoor on any otherterritoryoutsideof the formerDutch East Indies."20 On the occasionof a
visit to Portugalin 1961, Sukarnoreportedlyassured Dr. Salazar that
Portugueserightson Timorwouldbe respected.A UnitedNations"backgroundpaper" on Timorsumsthematterup as follows:
Foritspartthegovernment
of Indonesiahas declaredthatit maintains
friendly
relations
withPortugal
andhas no claimto Portuguese
Timor,
whichhas neverbeenpartof theDutchEast Indiesand therefore
is
notof thesamestatusas WestIrian[WestNew Guinea].21
But theabsenceofa historically
or legallyviableterritorial
claimto PortugueseTimordoes not ruleout the development
of a politicalclaim based
on criteriarelatednot to the colonialpast, but to the presentand future.
Althoughthe spokesmenof the Indonesiangovernment
officially
deny
territorial
ambitionswithrespectto Timor,thereis abundantevidenceto
indicatethat such ambitionsdo exist. Indonesianexpansivenationalism,
whichsomemightdefineas imperialism,
has been notedby a numberof
studentsof Indonesianforeign
policy.Thereis no need to provethatmodernIndonesiais seekingto recreatethe 14thcenturyMajapahit empireto
demonstrate
a constantthreadof expansionism
in the ideology,if not the
actionsof the Jakartagovernment.
One writerwho has followedclosely
Indonesia'srelationswithitsneighbors
sumsit up as follows:"In Djakarta,
19As reportedby the AustralianBroadcastingCommission,Jan. 19, 1963.
Subandrio,as reportedby Antara,Oct. 2, 1962.
21 United Nations doc. A/AC.108/L.13,Dec. 3, 1962,para. 35.
20
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however,
expansionist
goals-knownas 'GreaterIndonesia'-do seemto be
verynearthesurfaceof today'spolicies."22 PortugueseTimoris a natural
area of expansionist'sinterest.The authorhas spokenwith Indonesians
ofvariouspoliticalpersuasionsto whomtheacquisitionofPortuguese
Timor
is seen as part of a territorial
roundingout process.Indonesianattitudes
towardTimorare not framedin termsof conquest,but ratherthe "recovery"ofIndonesiairredenta.
Anyunofficial
"liberation"policywhichJakartamay have had towards
PortugueseTimorwas one of irresolute
indirection.
For instance,theIndonesianauthorities
on theemergence
wouldlook favorably
ofpoliticalmovementsostensiblyoriginating
in the Portugueseprovinceaimed at overthe colonialrule. With specificreferenceto North Borneo and
throwing
PortugueseTimor,GeneralNasutionhas said: "We supporttheirstrug23 If thegoal of the"freedom
gles,butdo notclaimtheirterritories."
fighters" shouldbe incorporation
into the Indonesianstate, Indonesiawould
not be unsympathetic.
Ruslan Abdulgani,speakingas Ministerof Information,has been uncontradicted
in his statementthat,"Althoughwe are
not an expansionist
nationwe cannotallow people of commonancestryto
be persecuted
and thrownin prisonmerelybecausetheywantto unitewith
the fatherland
of theirancestors."24 OtherIndonesianshave been more
specific:"If thepeople of Timortodayor tomorrow
starteda revolution,
... we wouldsupportthem.... After
if theywantedto stay
independence,
independent,
fine.... If theywantto join Indonesia,we willtalkit over."2"
Actual efforts
to create the conditionsof an anti-colonialstruggleon
Timorhave been tentativeand apparentlyhave arousedlittleenthusiasm.
In early1961,an organization
calledtheBureauofLiberationof theTimor
Republic,locatedin Jakarta,called on the people of Timor to driveout
the Portuguesecolonialists.A UnitedNations reporton Timor in 1962
notedtheexistenceof thisBureau (Committee),but statedthattherewas
no information
concerning
politicalactivityin PortugueseTimor. It was
claimedin Spring,1963,that"independence
fighters"
had set up a United
Republicof TimorDilly witha government
of 12 ministers
who had been
secretlyinstalledinside of PortugueseTimor in April.The release containingthis information
was signedby a personwho styledhimselfthe
"Director General of the Presidiumof the United Republic of Timor
Dilly" and was made publicin Jakarta.The reportsaid that the "United
Republicof TimorDilly" was functioning
as a nationand appealed for
recognition
by othergovernments.
The requestedrecognitions
were not
norhas the "government"
forthcoming,
of the "republic"availed itselfof
22 BernardK. Gordon,The Dimensionsof Conflictin Southeast Asia
(Prentice-Hall/
Spectrum,1966), p. 80.
23 GeneralNasution,speechat rallyat Purwokerto,Jan. 22, 1963.
24 As reportedby Radio Republic of Indonesia,Sept. 3, 1963.
25 General Mokoginta in interviewwith Warren Unna,
WashingtonPost, May 10,
1963,quoted by BernardK. Gordon,op. cit.,p. 94.
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by the UnitedNations Special Committeeconcerned
the platformoffered
facilIndonesia,otherthanoffering
withPortuguesedependentterritories.
does
itiesin Jakartato thepublicistsof theTimor"liberationmovement,"
notappearto have givenit muchsupport.If theUnitedRepublicof Timor
in Jakarta
politicalbody,its representatives
Dilly is in factan autonomous
rallysand
have beenwell concealed,nottakingpartin theanti-imperialist
programsthatwereonce a featureof lifein the Indonesiancapital.
in PorugueseTimordurThat theremayhavebeeninternaldisturbances
fromsourcesotherthanJakarta.There
ing the year 1963 can be inferred
of
in the second-half
was a troopbuild-upin PortugueseTimorbeginning
1962. A troopshipwas sentto Timorwith 1,000soldierstermedreplacements,but this forcewas reportedto outnumberthe entirePortuguese
garrisonon the island. In January1963, Portugueseofficialssaid that
defenseforcesconsistedof a fewtroopsonly.It was not clarifiedwhether
internalsecurityforcesas well as border
this statementcomprehended
forces.In May 1963, a memberof the PortugueseArmystaff,Col. Jose
AlbertyCorreia,was appointedGovernorof the province.In mid-1963,
but thendenied,thatelementsof the Portuguesegarrison
it was reported,
in Macao werebeingmovedto Timor.The defensebudgetforTimorwas
enlargedin 1963,reaching29 millionescudos,a figureequallinghalf the
of inlprovince'sordinaryrevenuesfor1963. If therewerethe beginnings
surrectionit has been contained.No real armed threatto Portuguese
authorityin Timor has materialized.The Lisbon authoritiesapparently
feelsecureenoughin Timor,bothin theirdomestccontroland theirrelain thedevelopment
tionswithIndonesia,to justifycontinuedexpenditures
a newemphasison tourism.
including
program,
All of the factorsappear to be presentthatwould be conduciveto an
forthe
activeIndonesian"liberation"policy.There is ample justification
of Indonesia'srevoluwrestingof TimorfromPortugalin the framework
than
tionaryideology.Timoris even a moreobviouscase of imperialism
limitson Indonesianstateactionare few.Insofar
Malaysia.The normative
as international
legal obligationsare concerned,the Indonesianview was
statedby Sukarno:"Colonialruleoveranothernation,although
succinctly
treaty,. . . must be
agreedin a certaininternational
perhapsformerly
got rid of as quicklyas possible."26 The precedentof Goa and external
assistanceto rebelgroupsin Africaindicatethatany IndonesianTimorese
aggression"
adventurecouldbe justifiedas defenseagainstthe"permanent
of colonialism.In the atmosphereof hostilitytowardsPortugalin the
of anotherbastionof the imperialworld,the destruction
African-Asian
if thisshouldresult
ists wouldreceivegeneralapprobation.Furthermore,
ofPortugueseTimorintoIndonesia,thiswouldreceive
in theincorporation
by theU.S.S.R.
is a statement
supportas well.Revealingin thisconnection
26

Sukarno,PoliticalManifesto,IndependenceDay Address,Aug. 17, 1959.
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thatforitspartit regardedPortugueseTimoras Indonesiannationalterritory.27
Not onlywould the generalideologicaland moralclimatein the antiimperialist
spherebe favorable,but the relativepowerpositionsof Portugal and Indonesiawould not be inhibitingto Indonesia. Militarily,the
in relationto disposableIndonesian
liberationof Timor,weaklygarrisoned
forces,and so remotefromPortugalas well as the Portugueseforcestied
down in Africa,would not constitutea problemfor Indonesia.Nor, as
experiencehas shown,could Portugalexpect directassistancefromher
allies.
all of theabove,we mustconcludethatdespiteaspirationsConsidering
ideologicaland imperial-Indonesiahas refrained
fromactivelyseekingto
of
forceout the Portugueseon the basis of an Indonesiandetermination
interest.That the liberationof PortugueseTimor does not have a high
priority
in therangingof Indonesian-Portuguese
relations.Therehad been
other,moreimmediatetasksset forthe policy: first,the "restoration"of
West Irian to the foldof the Republic,and thenthe attemptto foil the
"neocolonialist
plot" of Malaysia. A prematuremove againstPortuguese
Timorcould have been injuriousto Indonesianinterestin termsof the
accomplishment
ofthesetwomoreimportant
tasks.
In the West Irian dispute,the Indonesiancase was based on the claim
Netherlands
East Indies
thatWestIrianwas an integralpartof theformer
of Indonesian
and therefore
continuedDutch possessionwas a deprivation
territorial
rights.WestIrianwas a partof Indonesia'scolonialinheritance.
Indonesiawentto greatpains duringits diplomaticcampaignagainstthe
Dutch to stressthefiniteness
of its territorial
ambitions.In theconfrontationwithMalaysia, Indonesiaemphasizedthat territorial
aggrandizement
was nota goal; thatit had no claimto Sarawakor NorthBorneo."These
"nor is thereany
are notpartof our territory,"
Dr. Subandrioproclaimed,
reasonupon whichsuch a claimmightbe based."28 An aggressivepolicy
of IndotowardsPortugueseTimormighthave destroyedthe credibility
nesia's self-denying
positionon territorial
expansion.It would also have
increasedthe apprehensions
of Indonesia's neighborsas to the ultimate
goalsofIndonesiain SoutheastAsia.
One of the uneasyneighborsis Australia.It has watchedthe developmentof Indonesianforeignpolicywithseriousconcern.The Australians
assistanceof Malaysia in theconfrontation
withIndocameto themilitary
nesia,despiteIndonesianthreats.One of the calculationswhichIndonesia
wouldhave to makein weighingdecisionsabout PortugueseTimorwould
be Australianreaction.An aggressivepolicy towardsPortugueseTimor,
1047th
OfficialRecords,FourthCommittee,
27United NationsGeneralAssembly,
Nov. 11,1960.
meeting,
28 Subandrio,
in specialissue
of articleappearing
Indonesia'sForeignPolicy,reprint
ofLe Monde,May,1964.
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or in the serviceof anti-imperialism,
would alert
whetherfor territory
Australiato a real or supposeddangerto Australia'srolein theeasternhalf
of New Guinea. It wouldimmediately
place in doubt the value of Indonesianguaranteesof the inviolability
of the New Guinea border.Doubts
are alreadythere,butat thisstageofIndonesiannationaldevelopment,
and
in thefluxof creatinga newinternational
politicalorderin SoutheastAsia,
even a suspiciousAustraliafitsbetterinto the patternof Indonesianstate
interactions
thanan activelyhostileAustralia.We suggest,therefore,
that
althoughgiventhenon-interest
determinants
of Indonesianforeignpolicy,
the liberationof PortugueseTimorwas not attemptedbecause it would
not have furthered
Indonesia'sinterests;in fact,it mighthave been injuriousto interestin thoseareas of Indonesia'sforeignrelationsthatwere
assignedgreatervalue. Interest,however,is not immutable.
The FutureofPortugueseTimor
In a ringingdeclaration,the GeneralAssemblyof the UnitedNations
has said: "All peopleshave the rightto self-determination;
by virtueof
that righttheyfreelydeterminetheirpoliticalstatus and freelypursue
Both the GeneralAstheireconomic,social and culturaldevelopment."29
thatPortuguesepolicy
semblyand the SecurityCouncilhave determined
in its OverseasProvincesis violativeof thatright.Portugalhas been condemnedand sanctionshave been called for,but Portugalhas not been
responsiveto theAfrican-Asian
mood.In Timorthe Portugueseclaimthat
if thereare outself-determination
by the Timoresebecomesmeaningless
side (Indonesian)pressures.They can pointto Indonesianattitudesabout
of this.Secondly,to talk
in West Irian forjustification
self-determination
of independence
has no relevancein a discussionof Timor'sfuture.It is
difficult
to imaginethattheterritory
couldlive as an independent
political
unit in the Indonesianarchipelago.Politics,geography,economics,and
ethnicaffinities
militateagainstsucha development.
The Portugueserealize
this. Salazar told the PortugueseNational Assemblythat givenTimor's
life.30
positionin themidstof Indonesia,it wouldnot live an independent
Nor can the Portuguesebe expectedto voluntarily
of
transfer
sovereignty
PortugueseTimor to Indonesia.Such a transfer
would be, in theireyes,
unjust,not onlyto Portugalbut to the peoplesof Timor.
of a Portugueseroleon Timoron the surfaceis a funcThe persistence
tionof nationalism,
prestige,and a (newlyemergent)senseof mission.In
fact,therealheartofPortugueseresistanceto any changein thestatusquo
in Timoris its relationto the Salazar government's
completecommitment
to the maintenanceof the Portuguesestate intact. The erosionof the
of
Portuguese
positionat any one pointwouldweakenthe entirestructure
GeneralAssembly,Resolution1514 (XV), Dec. 14, 1960.
These questionswere raised by Dr. Salazar in his speech to the PortugueseNational Assemblyon June 30, 1961, as quoted in United Nations doc. A/AC.108/L.13,
Dec. 3, 1962,para. 36.
29
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the overseaspolicyand give ammunition
to the growingnumberof dissidentsin Metropolitan
Portugalwho are not identified
withthe empire.
It is doubtful,
however,thatPortugalwouldbe able to resistIndonesian
pressuresiftheyweretransformed
intoan Indonesianpolicyactivelyworking forthe endingof Portugueserule on Timor.Timoris not Angola or
Mozombique.Thereis no greateconomicvalue to PortugueseTimor.There
is no largeEuropeansettlercommunity
to complicatea transfer
of sovereignty.Timoris not defensible
by Portugal.An Indonesianadvancewould
probablyencounterthesame kindof resistancethatthe Indian armymet
in Goa.
Whatare thepossibilities
forthedevelopment
of an Indonesianforward
policy?Thereis no demandforimmediate
actionagainstPortugueseTimor.
From the vantagepointsof geography,politics,power,and population,
Indonesiais not in a comparativesituation.It does not have to pre-empt
a positionin Timor.The onlypressuresforless restraintemanatedfrom
ideology.This was disciplined,bowingto currentintereststhat put the
questionof Timorinto the future.On the otherhand,paradoxicalas it
may seem, the changeddirectionof Indonesianforeignpolicy towards
Malaysia, and the emergenceof a new government
that mustjustifyits
authority,
heightenthepossibilitiesof an IndonesianmoveagainstTimor.
The domesticIndonesianpoliticalrequirements
thatproducedconfrontationwithMalaysia have not reallyaltered.The new leadershipmay find
Timora usefuldivertissement
at somecriticalmomentin the future.This
is admittedlyspeculative.Less speculativeis the assumptionthat when
Indonesianideologyand interestconvergein a Timor"liberation"policy,
thePortuguesewillbe facedwiththerealitiesof powerin theArchipelago.
In conclusion,we can say that in a sense PortugueseTimor is a trust
territory,
thePortugueseholdingit in trustforIndonesia.
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